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From the middle of the nineteenth century, Japanese thinkers have been 
interested in Western philosophy. Since the Japanese originally believed that 
this foreign form of thought had no parallel in their tradition, they developed a 
new word to translate the idea of philosophy, namely, tetsugaku. This coining 
of a new term created some distance between the traditional forms of Japanese 
thought such as Buddhist doctrine and the new modes of analysis, speculation, 
and argumentation being imported from the West. To this day in Japan, the word 
tetsugaku has a distinctively Western ring and in most Japanese universities the 
study of tetsugaku is restricted to the study of Western philosophy. In fact, 
most Japanese departments of philosophy could be considered, in terms of the 
content of courses offered anyway, branch offices of Western, particularly 
German, departments.
As readers of the Eastern Buddhist are well aware, however, this view of 
philosophy is not universal among the Japanese. There are many Japanese 
thinkers who consider premodem Japanese thought to be a philosophical 
tradition distinct from, but also fundamentally in accord with, the basic moti­
vation and purpose of Western philosophy. In the work of these individuals there 
is valuable cross-fertilization and dialogue between the Eestem and Eastern 
intellectual traditions. Most of the creative work in this area has been done by 
members of the so-called Kyoto School of philosophy, a tradition having its 
roots at Kyoto University among the specialists in philosophy of religion. In 
particular, the tradition is considered to have its foundation in the writings of 
Nishida Kitard (1870-1945). In this article we will briefly review some of the 
main features of this tradition and discuss its interaction with Western thought 
as represented in Western scholarship and translations. Furthermore, some 
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comments and suggestions will be made about the future of this particular 
dialogue between East and West.
The Early Development of the Kyoto School
There is universal agreement that Nishida was the driving force behind this 
radically new way of doing philosophy in Japan and many of the early members 
of the School such as Tanabe Hajime were his direct disciples. Mention should 
also be made of Watsuji TetsurO as a peripheral member of the group. Although 
Watsuji was, in many respects, quite distant from the tradition—his major 
source of premodern inspiration was Confucianist rather than Buddhist, for 
example—he did study under Nishida and even dedicated a book to his former 
teacher. In fact, when we take into consideration his deep interest in existential 
philosophers, particularly Heidegger, he was very much in tune with some of the 
second-wave members of the Kyoto School such as Nishitani and Takeuchi. 
Ultimately, the issue is not whether to consider Watsuji to be a member of the 
School, but rather, to recognize him in his own right to be a great philosopher, 
deserving much more attention than he has thus far been given by Western 
scholars of modem Japanese philosophy.
It is sometimes assumed that the early figures in the Kyoto School were 
primarily interested in East-West synthesis or East-West dialogue, but the actual 
writings of Nishida, Tanabe, and Watsuji, for example, contain very little dia­
logue and only a very restricted kind of synthesis. For the purposes of this essay, 
we will focus only on Nishida since his role was most crucial in what was to 
follow.
First, a most telling fact is that Nishida never explicitly wrote any significant 
philosophical work for a Western audience. This fact is striking when we 
remember that Nishida knew German very well (he often wrote his journal 
entries in German) and he had close students who actually studied philosophy in 
Germany and were fluent in the language. Thus, there was no linguistric barrier 
preventing him from publishing works in German or at least supervising the 
German translation of his writings. If he were really interested in East-West 
dialogue or really committed to formulating a transcultural, world philosophy, 
he obviously could have made his ideas more available to non-Japanese. In this 
regard, his national isolation is in marked contrast with the international 
acclaim received by his lifelong friend, D. T. Suzuki.
This evidence for a lack of interest in global dialogue is, of course, 
circumstantial and it would be dangerous to speculate on Nishida’s intention 
simply on the grounds of what he did not do. Still, we should look more carefully 
at Nishida’s writings for a clearer sense of his philosophical motivations. This 
is no easy task and the issue requires a detailed and careful study. For now, 
126
THE KYOTO SCHOOL AND THE WEST
however, I wish to suggest a tentative theory that will not only help us to under­
stand Nishida better, but will also place the development of the Kyoto School 
within a larger historical and cultural context.
Since Nishida’s writings span mainly the period from 1910-1945, we cannot 
presume to interpret his work without considering the immediately preceding 
Meiji period, the time when Japan opened its doors to Western influence, 
including Western philosophy. When Japan was forced to trade with the West 
in the mid-nineteenth century, it was essentially a feudalistic society in its politics, 
economics, and technology. In a practical sense, Japan had to face the realities 
of its vulnerability. The United States had already filled its continent and was 
soon jumping across the Pacific into the Aleutians, Hawaii, Midway, and 
eventually the Philippines. Meanwhile, Britain and France were spreading east­
ward into India, Indo-China, and China. Russia was establishing its claim to the 
northern islands off Japan's coast. Thus, Japan had to choose between two 
alternatives: either it had to leave itself susceptible to Western colonization or it 
had to build a technological and military presence of its own. Obviously, the 
latter choice was taken.
In order to effect this radical transformation of its society, Japan had to 
adopt quickly many aspects of Western culture such as political structure, 
scientific development, industrialization, education, and social services. 
Christianity, in fact, was reintroduced into Japan as part of this absorption of 
Western culture. With the military success against Russia and China in the 
Meiji period, Japan grew confident that it was a burgeoning superpower and that 
it would be able to establish and sustain a sphere of influence throughout East 
and perhaps Southeast Asia as well as a major portion of the South Pacific.
A result of this striking success was that Japan now had the luxury to reflect 
on what it was doing and where it was going as a culture. In particular, the issue 
arose as to the proper relationship between Western and Japanese ideas. 
Certainly, the Japanese needed Western empiricism since it formed the basis of 
the technological revolution, but did the adoption of Western science commit 
them to a wholesale adoption of the Western philosophical and religious 
worldview? In the later Meiji period, this became a central intellectual debate. 
It was decided quite early that the connection between Christianity and science 
was an important link in the development of the Western tradition, but the 
connection was not necessary in Japan. Thus, Christianity was no longer pushed 
as an integral part of Japanese modernization. (It was decided after some 
discussion, for example, that it was not advisable for the emperor to become a 
Christian.)
It was much more difficult, however, to find a way of separating Western 
science from Western philosophy. On a popular philosophical level, the ideal 
was expressed in terms of a compromise: the Japanese would adopt Western 
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science and keep Eastern morality. For the more serious and profound Japanese 
philosophers, however, this was not an answer but a problem. How could the two 
coexist within a consistent philosophical system? This question gives, I believe, 
a clue to the motivation behind the philosophizing in the first phase of the Kyoto 
School’s development, particularly in Nishida’s own writings.
Nishida’s philosophy is usually discussed in terms of two phases: the earlier 
“pure experience” formulation and the later theory called the “logic of basho” 
that is, the “logic of place.” In discussing the differences between these two 
phases, though, we should be equally aware of their basic similarity and con­
tinuity. In the theory of pure experience developed in his first major work, Study 
of Good, Nishida tried to establish a single ground for all kinds of experience 
whether they be intuitive, empirical, rational, or creative. He sought this ground 
in the psychological unity, clarity, and presentness of what William James called 
“pure experience,” that is, raw givenness. In short, by using James’ theory of 
radical empiricism (philosophy should be based only on what we directly ex­
perience, but it should also take into account all that we directly experience) 
Nishida hoped to reveal the universal source of both empiricism and religious/ 
ethical/aesthetic intuitionalism.
From the standpoint of his own later work, Nishida himself criticized Study 
of Good as being overly psychologists and mystical. Certainly, most con­
temporary Western philosophers would agree with that evaluation. The enter­
prise was important in two crucial ways, however. First, it signaled the failure 
of Nishida’s final attempt to import and modify a Western philosophy as a 
remedy for the Japanese uneasiness about the relationship between Western 
science and traditional Japanese spirituality (whether religious, aesthetic, or 
ethical). In this way, Study of Good caribe seen as the final phase of the wholesale 
philosophical importation of ideas that marked the Meiji period. Second, 
Nishida’s dissatisfaction with the book convinced him that one could not 
simply translate traditional Japanese thinking into some already existing Western 
philosophical system. Rather, what was needed was a new logic (ronri), a new 
form of “Western” philosophy developed specifically in response to Japanese 
requirements. Thus, Nishida tried to develop a Western-like philosophy that 
would show the relative place of scientific thinking vis-i-vis the spirituality of 
traditional Japan. This seems to be the motivation behind the development of 
his later theory, the logic of basho or “place.”
Nishida’s logic of place is much too complex to discuss in detail here, but to 
follow the development of the Kyoto School, we need only look at the theory 
in its barest outline form. Essentially, the theory maintains that judgments can 
only take place within certain intellectual contexts and that ordinarily the con­
text within which a judgment occurs is not visible in the judgment itself, although 
the context forms a necessary background for the judging act.
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A crude example will make this clearer. Suppose I make the judgment “the 
book is on the table.” This judgment is taken to be an empirical fact, that is, it 
is a statement about the world independent of my interaction with it. The book is 
there whether I want it to be or not, whether I see it or not, whether I make a 
judgment about it or not. It is, in short, objective.
Yet, Nishida wonders, on what experience is that objectivity based? As soon 
as I ask how it is known, the objectivity of the judgment disappears. That is, the 
objective judgment “the book is on the table’* is really based in a different kind 
of judgment entirely, namely, “I perceive that the book is on the table.” This 
judgment involves not only the introduction of a psychological state (my percep­
tion) and my awareness of it (I know that I perceive it), but also an assumption 
about my consciousness itself, namely, that it is in accord with the world of 
external facts. Thus, Nishida reasons, the empirical judgment has its “place” 
only within the greater realm of self-consciousness. Nishida calls the first realm, 
that of the world of physicality, the basho of being. The second realm, that of 
self-consciousness, is sometimes called the basho of relatively nothing. Relative 
to the realm of objective judgment, it is a nothing, yet it is a nothing that makes 
possible the realm of objectivity. (Husserl makes a similar point, for example, in 
claiming that the scientific viewpoint is not objective in the sense that it is devoid 
of subjective intentionality. Rather, the scientific viewpoint is an intentional 
attitude in which subjective feelings are bracketed out of the experience and not 
taken into consideration. They are, in Husserl’s terminology, “neutralized,” an 
idea quite close to the kind of nothing that Nishida is talking about here.)
But is the basho of self-consciousness completely self-contained or does it, in 
turn, have its place within some other place? Consistent with his Buddhist 
background, Nishida is suspicious of the substantialization of the self. Even 
the Kantian or Husserlian transcendental ego seems to Nishida an abstraction 
not directly derived from concrete experience. Rather, Nishida argues, the self 
of self-consciousness is not an entity at all, but an act. It is, in his terms, an 
acting-intuiting (kGiteki chokkan). This concept is often left obscure in Nishida’s 
own account, but the main point seems to be that judgment is possible only as 
an interactive flow from the person into the world (as the attitude, the action, 
the intentionality) simultaneous with the flow of the world into the person (as 
the givenness, the sensation, the presence). Thus, at the basis of every judgment is 
the interaction of the person with the world and the world with the person. The 
two cannot ultimately be separated. Subjectivity and objectivity are two profiles 
of the same event. This event is the true self, the most fundamental level of 
personhood. There is nothing outside it to which it can be relativized; hence, it 
is absolute. Yet, to talk about or judge its content, one must relocate the discus­
sion into one of the other two basho. In itself, this ground of experience is 
directly known, but ineffable; hence, it is a nothing. Consequently, Nishida 
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refers to this basho as the realm of “absolutely nothing” (zettai mu}.
If one needed to accept Nishida’s basho theory in its entirety to qualify as a 
member of the Kyoto School, the School would have only one member. Even 
the first major successor to Nishida’s philosophical chair, Tanabe Hajime, had 
qualms about the system. In simplest terms, Tanabe believed that Nishida 
overemphasized the logical aspect of the structure and failed to explain properly 
the relationship between the spiritual and scientific. According to Tanabe, 
Nishida’s structure lost the dialectical tension at the core of religious experience. 
That is, Nishida was criticized for substituting the stasis of logic for the dynamics 
of paradox. (It is noteworthy, by the way, that Tanabe came out of the Shin 
Buddhist, rather than Zen Buddhist, tradition.) In fact, Nishida himself never 
seemed completely satisfied with his own formulation. He was an intrepid 
revisionist who was always tinkering with new formulations and new systems. 
Although his actual systems may have been very rigorous, Nishida’s approach 
to philosophizing was very open to exploring new vistas. Because of this open­
ness, the Kyoto School was not locked into a specific terminology or systematic 
formulation. Rather, what marks the School is the persistent pursuit of certain 
key philosophical concerns. The nature of these concerns became clearer as the 
School itself developed.
The Later Development of the Kyoto School
With the next generation and the emergence of such philosophers as 
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, Nishitani Keiji, Takeuchi Yoshinori, Abe Masao, and 
Ueda Shizuteru, the Kyoto School took on a new form. With the exception of 
Hisamatsu, all of these philosophers are still living. All of them are much more 
knowledgeable about the Western philosophical (especially Continental) tradi­
tion and all of them studied or lectured in the West whereas Nishida never left 
Japan. Quite understandably, then, this later generation of scholars has actively 
involved itself in East-West dialogue. In general, this focus on comparative 
philosophizing and interacting with colleagues abroad is a hallmark of the Kyoto 
School in its present form.
Two important influences on the later Kyoto School deserve special mention. 
First, virtually all of present members have been deeply influenced by the 
existential-phenomenological tradition, particularly Heidegger. One of the 
misfortunes of history is that Nishida never really had the opportunity to interact 
with the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. He did teach a seminar on 
Husserl and he did have some acquaintance with Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
but his study of these figures came too late in Nishida’s career for them to be 
assimilated in great depth. As already noted, by the second decade of the 
twentieth century, Nishida was already blazing his own trail in developing a 
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Westem-like philosophy. Because of these historical factors, Nishida’s com­
ments on Husserl and Heidegger are sometimes insightful, sometimes disappoint­
ing, but always too brief. If there was a clear Western influence on Nishida’s 
later thought, it was probably that of the Neo-Kantian Southern School: the 
philosophies of Rickert, Windelband, and Lask, for example. Viewed from our 
present perspective, however, this was only a peripheral movement in the 
development of twentieth-century Western philosophy and it cannot serve as a 
useful vehicle for dialogue between East and West. Thus, the interest of the 
contemporary Kyoto School in such philosophers as Heidegger is much more in 
harmony with the interests of Western Continental philosophy today.
The second important influence on the contemporary Kyoto School was the 
life and work of D. T. Suzuki. It is not accidental, for example, that most of 
the Kyoto School philosophy published in English has been printed in the 
Eastern Buddhist, the journal founded by Suzuki expressly for the purpose of 
East-West dialogue. From a strictly objective, Western vantage point, this is a 
strange development. Suzuki was not a member of the Kyoto School. In fact, 
he was not a philosopher at all, at least in the sense of formal training. 
Although his impact on Western, especially American, culture has been extensive 
in the areas of poetry, aesthetics, and general spirituality, his influence on 
Western philosophy has been nil. In fact, in some ways, his writings permanently 
alienated a significant portion of a whole generation of Western philosophers. 
Because of their exposure to Suzuki, for example, many professional Western 
philosophers will never read any works on Eastern thought, not as philosophical 
literature, anyway. This is understandable when we consider that Suzuki’s 
greatest popularity in the United States was in the late 195O’s and 1960’s, about 
the same time that American philosophy assumed a strong analytic orientation. 
To a philosopher attempting to make philosophical language ever more precise 
and philosophical statements verifiable by empirical data, Suzuki’s approach 
must have seemed outrageous.
There is another, more profound, way to evaluate Suzuki’s influence, however. 
Suzuki’s great contribution was not what he said but what he did. Suzuki’s 
charismatic presence opened up the dialogue between East and West. Whereas 
many orthodox Western philosophers were dismayed at Suzuki’s approach, 
many theologians found it refreshing and illuminating. The theological admirers 
covered a spectral range so broad as to include both Alan Watts and Paul 
Tillich. Furthermore, there were little pockets of philosophical interest (especially 
among those in the Continental tradition) that did not follow the pattern of the 
mainstream. Heidegger himself was impressed by Suzuki in their personal 
encounter.
Less visible, but more important, was Suzuki’s influence on Western studies 
of Buddhism. Many of today’s younger generation of Western Buddhist scholars 
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were first attracted to Buddhist studies through reading Suzuki. This means that 
the study of Buddhism in the West was taken somewhat out of the halls of 
philological and historical studies and brought closer to religious and theological 
concerns. The impact of this new orientation has only just begun, but in future 
decades perhaps, the Western study of Buddhism will gradually take a new 
direction. Many of the younger scholars have had training in Buddhist practice 
as well as Buddhist doctrines, history, and textual analysis. Most of them are 
uncomfortable with Suzuki's mode of explanation, but many of them share 
Suzuki's concerns.
The purpose of pointing out these influences on the contemporary Kyoto 
School is to demonstrate that a common meeting ground for Japanese-Western 
philosophical dialogue is being mapped out. The major defining boundaries 
seem to include: (1) the existential-phenomenological tradition; (2) Buddhist- 
Christian dialogue on a theological plane; (3) Buddhist studies with an emphasis 
on the interrelationship between Buddhist practice and Buddhist thought. At 
the conclusion of this article, I will make some specific recommendations about 
the direction I would recommend for future dialogue. First, however, we should 
review briefly the work that has already been done in the West.
Translations
Nishida Kitard. A Study of Good; trans. Valdo H. Viglielmo.
Art and Morality ; trans. David A. Dilworth and Valdo 
H. Viglielmo (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 
1973).
Fundamental Problems of Philosophy; trans. David A. 
Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1970). 
Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness; trans. 
Robert Schinzinger (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1973).
Watsuji Tetsuro. Climate and Culture; trans. George Bownas (originally 
published as Climate by Japanese Government Printing 
Company; periodically republished by Tokyo: 
Hokuseido Press).
Frederick Franck (editor). The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto 
School (NY: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982).
As the above list of book-length translations indicates, Nishida is still 
presented as the main figure of the Kyoto School. This is understandable since, 
as we have indicated above, Nishida can be considered the inspiration behind the 
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whole movement. Yet, he continues to be virtually unknown among Western 
philosophers and the translations are not best-sellers even among philosophically 
oriented audiences. There are several reasons for this lack of interest, two of 
which we can consider here.
First, there has been no book-length study of Nishida in any Western language. 
Thus, to the Western reader needing a guide through Nishida’s writings (and 
who does not?), there is no good single source to which one can be referred. This 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of the translations have inadequate 
introductions. They tend to introduce the work in a general fashion, but do not 
present the reader with a detailed analysis and explanation. Furthermore, there 
is usually a lack of explanatory footnotes. This is a self-defeating approach to 
presenting Nishida to Western readers, since Nishida’s writings, even in Japanese, 
are not easy to follow. This observations leads us into our second point.
As we have already noted, Nishida did not address an international audience. 
He did not write in a Western style, using Western terminology,because he wanted 
to interact with Western philosophers. On the contrary, he was writing in a 
Western style for his fellow Japanese. He was trying to develop a Western style 
philosophy for us (the Japanese) so that we could integrate the new Western 
empirical, scientific worldview with our own cultural tradition’s emphasis on 
ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual intuition.
This does not mean that Nishida’s philosophy is culture-bound and has no 
value in the global development of philosophy. But it does imply that any 
presenter of Nishida’s ideas to the West must be prepared to build a bridge 
between Nishida’s immediately intended audience and the larger world com­
munity. An effective translation of Nishida’s works, therefore, must include a 
detailed introduction to the plan and purpose of the book as well as extensive 
explanatory notes. In this one respect, Schinzinger’s attempt should be singled 
out as a step in the right direction. He limits his book to the translation of three 
essays from Nishida’s later phase of thought and includes a general introductory 
essay as well as specific explanations for each of the three essays translated. 
Viglielmo’s translation of Study of Good also includes an introduction by D. T. 
Suzuki which is interesting in presenting a sense of what the book intends to do 
and a concluding interpretive essay by Shimomura which is somewhat helpful. 
What is really needed, however, is a more philosophical explanation that would 
go over the key points in each of the four parts of the book.
In the near future we should see the publication of two much needed new 
translations of Study of Good', a German version supervised by Ueda Shizuteru 
and an English version supervised by Abe Masao. Since both of these translators 
are themselves distinguished philosophers related to the Kyoto School and 
since both are sensitive to the mindset of Western audiences, it is hoped that 




Furthermore, Dilworth and Viglielmo have reportedly finished drafts of 
Nishida’s other works. Perhaps we will soon see a translation of one of the 
central works in the development of the later basho theory such as Hataraku 
mono kara miru mono e [From that which functions to that which sees]. Such a 
translation would be invaluable in bridging the early viewpoint (Study of Good 
and Art and Morality) with the later system (Fundamental Problems and Intel­
ligibility), Again, the translation would only be useful, however, if there were 
an extensive introduction and detailed explanatory notation. By his own philo­
sophical essays on Nishida, Dilworth has demonstrated that he has the back­
ground to supply this essential interpretive apparatus and I hope that he will 
choose to do so for such a volume.
The Watsuji book deserves a brief mention since it is the only translation of 
a major work by this extraordinary thinker. Although the translation is very 
good and readable, the content of the book—the relation between climate and 
the development of a culture’s intellectual tradition—is hardly a topic of interest 
to most Western philosophers. This, I believe, is more an indication of the narrow­
ness of the Western philosophical mind than a fair evaluation of the importance 
of Watsuji’s work, but to demonstrate that point would require a book about 
Watsuji’s Climate and not merely a translation of it. Instead, I would recommend 
that someone translate the Rinrigaku (Ethics) or at least the shorter Ningengaku 
to shite no rinrigaku (Ethics as the study of human being). Again, a comprehen­
sive philosophical introduction and extensive footnotes would be required, but 
the topic would at least be closer to traditional Western interests and would, 
I believe, be a more representative example of Watsuji’s own philosophical 
development.
In the case of Franck’s Buddha Eye, we have quite a different sort of book. 
It mainly consists of a collection of essays by various members of the Kyoto 
School as well as by various individuals loosely related to the School. There are 
also some essays that have no relationship whatsoever to the Kyoto School such 
as Ikkyu (who preceded Nishida by half a millenium), Kiyozawa Manshi, and 
Soga Ryojin. In fact, most of the essays are taken from back issues of the 
Eastern Buddhist and this seems to be the unifying thread. Thus, while the use of 
the term “Kyoto School” in the subtitle is a serious misnomer, at least the book 
is correct in identifying the Eastern Buddhist as the unofficial organ of the present 
day Kyoto School.
The book has two particular strengths. First, Franck uses a provocative 
tripartite structure to interweave the selected essays: Essays on the Self; Struc­
ture of Reality; What is Shin Buddhism? Franck states quite clearly that he 
selected the essays in part on the criterion of how much value he personally 
extracted from them as an interested, Western nonspecialist. His judgment in 
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most cases is quite sound and the juxtaposition of essays is provocative in 
eliciting a Western response. Some of the essays are already recognized as 
classics and some of the others should be. (1 have personally found the writings 
of Kiyozawa to be an excellent introduction to Shin Buddhism for Western 
undergraduates, for example. More translations of his writings should appear in 
readily available form.) As a paperback, the book could find a place in some 
college courses on comparative religion or comparative philosophy.
The second strength of the book is that it creates a handy anthology of what 
contemporary Japanese philosophers such as Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, Nishitani 
Keiji, Takeuchi Yoshinori, Abe Masao, and Ueda Shizuteru can offer to the 
dialogue between the spiritual traditions of East and West. In many respects, 
the Kyoto School is a world leader in the comparative study of the philosophy 
of religion, but the work of its members has not been readily available to most 
Western readers. Thus, this book provides a service to Western students of 
religion who wish to broaden their understanding of cross-cultural religious and 
philosophical dialogue.
The major limitation of the book is the problem of where it fits into the larger 
context of the interaction of the Kyoto School with the West. The Kyoto School 
is, after all, a philosophical tradition and this first book in a Western language 
to use the term “Kyoto School” in its title includes several nonphilosophical 
essays. Thus, we have once again the problem of D. T. Suzuki's influence on how 
Japanese philosophy is viewed by Western philosophers. From this standpoint, 
it would have been better if Franck more clearly separated the essays which 
properly belong to Kyoto School from those which might be called background 
essays related to themes picked up by the Kyoto School. To do this, however, 
would tear apart that very structure of the book which I consider to be so 
provocative.
Thus, the best alternative would have been to omit the term “Kyoto School” 
entirely. For the purpose of creating more interaction between Japanese and 
Western philosophers, it is counterproductive to lump Ikkyu, D. T. Suzuki, and 
Kiyozawa Manshi into the same category as Nishida or Nishitani, for example. 
This is not to make a value judgment as to which group of thinkers is better 
but rather, to point out that their methods and purposes are fundamentally 
different. Conversely, if Nishida were the recognized paradigm in the West of a 
Japanese thinker, it would be a disservice to Suzuki to lump him into the same 
category. For the present, I think it would be best to consider the Kyoto School 
a technical term referring to a specific philosophical tradition originating out of 




Gino K. Piovesana. Contemporary Japanese Philosophical Thought (NY: St. 
John’s University Press, 1969).
Hans Waldenfels. Absolute Nothingness ', Foundations of a Buddhist-Christian 
Dialogue. Translated by J. W. Heisig (NY: Paulist Press, 1980).
As already mentioned, there is a dearth of Western commentaries on the 
Kyoto School. Piovesana remains the classic English summary of modem 
Japanese philosophy, although it is now clearly dated and would benefit from 
a discussion of developments that have taken place in the last two decades. 
Furthermore, precisely because it is a survey, Piovesana strove for completeness 
in breadth, not depth. The discussions of the main philosophical figures are 
necessarily very short, therefore. The book is most valuable for giving the 
historical background out of which the Kyoto School developed. Nishida’s 
philosophy did not just arise spontaneously; it was a response to issues first 
formulated and discussed in the Meiji period. The problem, if any, is that 
Piovesana's book needs a companion survey of premodem Japanese philosophy. 
That is, because there is no such study available in English at present, the un­
informed Western reader may assume that modem Japanese philosophy can be 
understood without reference to the premodem period. Piovesana himself does 
not, of course, make this claim, but the misunderstanding is possible as long as 
there remains this gap in the Western treatment of modem Japanese philosophy.
In this regard, Waldenfels book is very clearly on the right track. Before 
embarking on a discussion of Nishitani’s philosophy of religion, he spends 
about fifty pages discussing the roots of Nishitani’s thought in early Buddhism, 
Nig&juna, Zen, and Nishida. This background material is essential for seeing 
the Kyoto School within the tradition of Japanese thought at large. One of the 
difficulties Western philosophers have encountered in trying to understand 
Nishida, for example, is that his thought is, in a sense, thoroughly Buddhist 
even though very few explicit references to Buddhism are made. Waldenfels 
makes this point most poignantly on page 36:
And here I agree that some psychological preparation is required for the 
Western reader [of Nishida], some basic knowledge of Buddhism and its 
understanding of Zen, some knowledge of Nishida’s personal background 
and finally, some guidance in the study even of the translations of Nishida. 
For there are, besides the rare cases that Buddhism, the teaching of Shinran, 
etc., are mentioned directly, some quotations, short sayings as they are used 
by Zen masters in their instructions—sayings that after some time 
become dear and familiar to their disciples in the same way as Scripture 
sayings become dear to the Christian.
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In short, Waldenfels is acutely sensitive to the necessity of putting the Kyoto 
School figures into their own premodem intellectual tradition.
The question now arises of whether Waldenfels’ treatment of this tradition is 
adequate. In general, his background material functions quite well, but there 
are two serious problems. First, Waldenfels too readily slips into a historical 
approach, particularly of the Zen tradition. Even though he has a subsection of 
the chapter on Zen called “Theory and Praxis in Zen Buddhism,” we really find 
there only theory. The connection with Yogacara, the now all too familiar dis­
cussion of the Platform Sutra (analyzed & la Thomas Merton), and the passing 
discussion of Dogen and Hakuin do not come to grips with the Zen meditational 
experience itself. Waldenfels really discusses nothing more than doctrinal 
observations.
If Zen-Christian dialogue is to progress on anything other than an abstract 
theological plane, one must take into account Zen’s most radical philosophical 
claim, namely, that the way the world appears in zazen is the way the world 
really is. Thus, if one wants to know reality, one does not analyze it, one does 
not accumulate empirical data about it, one does not reason logically about it. 
One just perceives it in its prereflective, preconceptual showing of itself. In this 
respect Zen seeks to avoid all reductionism as well as all transcendence in the 
usual Western sense of the word. Thus, the phenomenological structure of the 
zazen experience itself is critical to understanding the nature of verification or 
authentication in Zen. In fact, one might say that the character of the primordial 
givenness of the zazen experience and its relationship to other modes of con­
sciousness is a central issue in Japanese thinkers from Dogen to the present 
Kyoto School philosophers.
A second problem with Waldenfels’ discussion of the background of the Kyoto 
School is that he does not deal with the distinctiveness of Japanese Buddhism. 
The Japanese Buddhist tradition and, consequently, the philosophical predeces­
sors of the Kyoto School, were not simply Buddhists or even Zen Buddhists. 
They were also very much Japanese. The nature of this Japaneseness is difficult 
to define, but it must be taken into account. It is not just fortuitous that there is 
no work in Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, or Korean Buddhism that is like DSgen’s 
Shdbtigenzd, for instance. Ddgen did not simply leave his teachings to be recorded 
posthumously by his disciples as was the usual custom in Chinese Ch’an. Instead, 
he took up his brush and wrote about the structure of the Zen experience. Hakuin, 
too, broke the usual rules of tradition by explicitly describing the details of his 
own enlightenment experiences. Thus, the Japanese Zen tradition has a much 
more varied and rich literary expression than we find in Chinese Ch’an.
Perhaps this expressiveness can be traced to the impact of the esoteric Buddhist 
tradition, whether tomitsu (the Shingon form) or taimitsu (the Tendai form), 
on Japanese Buddhism at large. The founders of the Kamakura Buddhist 
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Schools (Pure Land, Zen, Nichiren) were, after all, all trained as Tendai monks 
on Mt. Hiei, an institution that had become quite esoteric in orientation by the 
end of the Heian period. Tamaki Kdshird, an eminent scholar on the develop­
ment of Buddhism, has repeatedly noted that the doctrine of hosshin seppo, “the 
Dharmakaya preaches the dharma,” is an idea given unique prominence in 
the Japanese tradition. In other words, the Japanese Buddhists tended to 
emphasize the idea that this world, as it is, is the expression of truth. Yet, in the 
very presence of this world, there is a depth which cannot be spoken but which is 
the basis of all expression.
This is not really a Buddhist idea so much as a Japanese idea and we find it in 
aesthetic discussions about such terms as yugen, “shadowy profundity,” and in 
moral discussions about such ideas as makoto no kokoro, “the genuine heart.” 
In this context, for example, Zeami’s discussions of the cultivation of the Nd 
actor, or Fujiwara no Teika’s discussion of how to write waka, or even Motoori 
Norinaga’s discussion of how to understand the Heian ideal of mono no aware 
are as much a part of the Japanese spiritual tradition from which the Kyoto 
School draws its inspiration as is Indian Yogacara or Chinese Ch’an. On the 
deepest level of cultural experience, I would argue, Buddhism was as much 
absorbed into Japanese culture as it was an influence on the development of 
Japanese culture.
The importance of this point will be reemphasized in my conclusion, but for 
now, we need only note that Waldenfels does not include this cultural aspect in 
his background discussion. This does not mean that Nishitani explicitly refers 
to the non-Buddhist intellectual tradition of Japan, but rather, that the Western 
audience needs some knowledge of this milieu if it is to follow the problematic 
of Nishitani’s philosophy. In other words, a discussion of non-Buddhist Japanese 
thought would help bridge the cultural gap that separates the Western audience 
from becoming fully involved in the ideas of the Kyoto School.
In Part II of his book, Waldenfels gives a sensitive and perceptive account of 
Nishitani’s philosophical anthropology and its relation to his philosophy of 
religion. Drawing mainly from Nishitani’s classic work, What Is Religion? (a 
translation of which was serialized in the Eastern Buddhist and will soon be 
published in book form), Waldenfels gives a clear account of Nishitani’s basic 
concepts of nihilum, scientism, nothingness, and personhood (the I-Thou 
relation). Waldenfels is excellent in articulating the existential problematic of 
human existence as outlined in Nishitani’s philosophy of religion and he takes 
pains to draw the connections between Nishitani and Heidegger wherever they 
seem relevant. This clear and sympathetic treatment of Nishitani’s complex 
philosophy is enough in itself to justify the importance of the book, but in Part 
III Waldenfels goes on to set the stage for the use of this philosophy as a vehicle 
for Christian-Buddhist dialogue.
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Waldenfels begins with a helpful clarification of the meaning of mysticism as 
defined by members of the Kyoto School such as Nishitani and Ueda as well 
as by Western, especially Catholic, theologians like Karl Rahner and Hans Urs 
von Balthasar. The analysis of mysticism in both cases concludes with a con­
sideration of the limitations of language and the importance of the relationship 
between apophatic and cataphatic theologies. In general, Waldenfels believes 
that the Christian tradition needs to reemphasize the almost submerged tradition 
of apophatic or negative theology. This observation leads into the next chapter’s 
consideration of the relationship between God and emptiness.
Several members of the Kyoto School including Nishida and Nishitani have 
basically equated God with emptiness or nothingness. Waldenfels recognizes 
that this equation creates serious problems for the traditional Christian under­
standing, particularly in terms of the personhood of God, but he wonders 
whether the notion is as foreign as it may at first seem. Again following Rahner, 
Waldenfels emphasizes the element of mystery embedded in the nature of God. 
As defined by Rahner this mystery can be articulated in terms of an emptiness 
or nothingness, an emptiness which, as the ground of all that exists, is also a 
fulness. Thus, Waldenfels finds an important Catholic theological parallel to 
the established position of the Kyoto School. Furthermore, Waldenfels attempts 
to demonstrate that the usual Kyoto School critiques of the Christian “sub- 
stantialization” of God cannot apply to a position like Rahner’s.
In his final chapter, Waldenfels extends this idea to the Christian doctrine of 
kenosis, that is, the Pauline statement that God “emptied himself” to become 
incarnate as Christ. In this emptying, as an indication ofthe nature of both divine 
and human personhood, Waldenfels once again sees a narrowing of the distance 
between the religious philosophy of the Kyoto School and a certain type of 
Christian (especially Roman Catholic) theology.
Waldenfels’ attempt at establishing a basis for dialogue between Catholic 
theologians and philosophers of the Kyoto School is a daring and exciting enter­
prise. His book, especially Parts II and III, deserves a most careful reading and 
evaluation, much more than we can give it here. A few points do, however, 
stand out and can be mentioned briefly.
First, the Rahnerian notion of mystery will have to be further refined if it is to 
serve as a bridge with the Kyoto School. In a certain respect, for the Zen Buddhist 
there is no mystery. Things are present just as they are; we need only remove our 
self-delusions if we are to perceive them as such. Waldenfels slips around this 
potential criticism from the Kyoto School by reducing the concept of mystery, 
when convenient, into merely the claim of ineffability. But, in fact, this is quite 
contrary to Rahner’s overall intent. The mystery in beings is precisely their 
expressiveness. The world is grounded in mystery because it is the expression of 
Logos. The world is, as it were, God’s expression of Himself to Himself. Thus, 
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Rahner’s sense of mystery is intimately tied to his concept of symbols. The 
meaning of the world is always pointing beyond itself to its creative origin.
We may note, however, that this idea is very similar to the previously men­
tioned doctrine of hosshin seppd, “the Dharmakaya preaches the dharma.” 
Thus, Nishitani, and the Kyoto philosophers in general, must be pressed to 
explain the nature and function of the Dharmakaya. Ddgen, for example, says 
that mountains and waters are themselves sOtras, are themselves patriarchs. 
This implies that they are not simply being mountains, but they are also somehow 
expressive of the dharma. What does this mean? Perhaps a dialogue in which 
this notion is compared with Rahner’s notion of symbols would be helpful.
Second, following on our previous observation, Nishitani must be pressed 
to explain the relationship between religious spirituality and artistic creativity. 
A hallmark of the Zen tradition is precisely the connection between religion and 
art. Hisamatsu, of course, was very much concerned with this issue, but even 
Nishida wanted to find the common ground of beauty, truth, and the good. In 
a sense, the metaphysics of nothingness is too safe a realm for interreligious 
dialogue. We must continually ask ourselves what the experience of nothingness 
or the experience of kenosis means to me as a Buddhist or as a Christian. Theology 
is very dangerous if it becomes detached from the expressions of everyday life.
Third, as a corollary to the concern for application in everyday life, more 
focus must be given to religious practice. Is prayer in any way an activity similar 
to zazen, for example? If not, what is the point of discussing the theological 
similarities or differences behind the practices? With regard to this type of in­
quiry, the work of scholars like William Johnston is very important. As Johnston 
has pointed out, meditation and prayer are physical as well as intellectual or 
spiritual activities. To understand their true function, we must take into account 
all of these dimensions. In this regard, we should look carefully at the stages of 
progress in one’s practice as discussed by both the Christian and Buddhist 
traditions. Nishitani, in effect, does this with his discussion of the Great Death 
and its relevance in today’s society. Does Christianity have any similar ex­
periential category?
Fourth, we should take the Zen Buddhist’s advice and be careful lest we be­
come too attached to words. The very notion of nothingness entails the recogni­
tion of the limitation of language. Why, then, do Christian-Buddhist dialogues so 
often result in the Buddhists* claiming that their idea of nothingness is better 
than the Christian’s idea of Being and vice versa? Are we absolutely certain that 
the Buddhist notion of nothing is not virtually identical with the Christian notion 
of Being? Neither idea in its traditional and proper sense seems particularly 
nihilistic or particularly substantialist. If we return to the phenomenology of the 
experience of Being and the experience of Nothingness, we may be able to 
concretize our comparisons and contrasts.
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In any case, Waldenfels’ book is a treasury of provoking ideas and avenues for 
future research and discussion. It is hoped that it will be only the first such 
attempt at interreligious dialogue. In fact, through correspondence with 
Professor Fritz Buri, I am informed that a new book on this topic will be 
available in the very near future, namely, his Der Buddha-Christus als der Herr 
des wahren Selbst: Die Religionsphilosophie der Kyoto-Schuleunddas Christentum 
(Verlag Paul Haupt, Bern und Stuttgart, 1982). Although I have thus far only 
seen the galleys of the Preface and Table of Contents, it is clear that the book 
will be another pioneering work. First, the work will continue the dialogue 
initiated by Waldenfels except that it will deal more explicitly with the symbol 
systems of self-understanding and personal liberation in both the Buddhist and 
Christian traditions. More importantly for our present purposes, however, is 
that fact that most of the chapters in the book deal specifically with the phi­
losophies of the major figures in the Kyoto School: Nishida, Tanabe, Suzuki, 
Hisamatsu, Nishitani, Takeuchi, Ueda, and Abe. The Table of Contents in­
dicates that each figure will be analyzed in terms of a particular theme and central 
interest. Thus, the reader should receive both an overall picture of the Kyoto 
School and some detailed knowledge of how the various figures differ in perspec­
tive and emphasis. Judging from the limited materials available to me, the 
structure of the book seems particularly interesting and useful.
It is, of course, impossible to make any judgment about the book at this 
stage, but since the point is relevant to our discussion in this article, I will make 
one brief observation. In his Preface (pages 8 and 9 of the galleys), Buri refers 
several times to the common theme of “Transzendenz” in the two traditions. In 
fact, he says that the phrase “Der Herr des wahren Selbst” is “ein Ausdruck 
des Transzendenzbezogenheit des Selbstverstindnisses” and that he sees the 
symbol of the Buddha-Christ “als Symbol der Transzendenz.” I am not sure 
what Buri means by this “transcendence” but the idea should be an interesting 
point of discussion. Can the word transcendence really be used without equivoca­
tion to refer to some aspect of both Christianity and Buddhism? I wonder 
whether this issue will take us back to the problem of Being vs Nothingness.
This is not in any way meant to be a criticism of Buri—I certainly cannot pre­
sume to understand his use of the concept simply by reading his Preface. Rather, 
I am only pointing out the difficulty of terminology for any cross-cultural 
philosophical or theological dialogue. So many interreligious conversations 
seem to turn on the issue of whether a certain word from one tradition can be 
properly applied in another.
In any case, the book looks interesting and I hope it receives the attention it 
deserves and that an English translation like that of Waldenfels might be forth­
coming. I suspect that Buri's work would be a valuable resource for American 




As we have seen, Western interaction with the Kyoto School has been slow in 
developing. One reason for this is that until recently there has been little secon­
dary material analyzing the School and translations have been limited mainly 
to the works of Nishida. With the recent publication of Waldenfels’ book and 
the forthcoming work by Buri, however, we are finally getting commentaries 
that will help immensely in developing the Western awareness of this important 
and creative tradition. Furthermore, Franck has collected some provocative 
essays into a handy, attractive anthology that should also make the writings of 
the Kyoto School more accessible. The translation of Nishitani’s What Is 
Religion? is also expected to be published soon as well as two new translations 
of Nishida’s Study of Good, perhaps still the best starting point for the study of 
modem Japanese philosophy. Thus, in many ways, the future of Western studies 
on the Kyoto School seems bright.
Yet, there are still difficulties to be surmounted. First, the Kyoto School has 
yet to make any significant impact on Western philosophy per se. Most of the 
dialogue with the West has been in theological, not purely philosophical, forums. 
Why is there this disparity? From a narrowly defined analytic philosophical 
perspective, the Kyoto School philosophers can be unfairly accused of generat­
ing meaningless metaphysical abstractions. To take one example, suppose one 
grants that concepts may be empty. It does not follow from this that we need the 
category emptiness, a category to be opposed to another abstraction, Being. 
Now it may be that Zen Buddhists like Suzuki speak as they do because that way 
of speaking is useful in leading someone to an insight, but that does not make 
their utterances themselves philosophical. They are simply performatives, 
statements used to do something, not to say something. In short, to a certain 
extent, narrow analytic philosophers would criticize the Kyoto School on many 
of the same points they criticize the Western Continental tradition.
Certain Continental philosophers, on the other hand, would level a quite 
different criticism, namely, that the Kyoto School philosophers often blur the 
distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics. In other words, they main­
tain it is always important to distinguish whether one is describing (or analyzing) 
the structure of an experience or the structure of a metaphysical entity. Does 
mu (nothingness) refer to the way things are experienced or does it refer to the 
thing that is experienced? The difference is crucial because it affects one’s 
methodology. In talking about the relationship between Being and Nothingness, 
for example, is one describing an aspect of experience or is one logically deducing 
what the relationship must be?
Everyone admits that some experiences arc ambiguous, are difficult to describe 
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without contradiction, but very few Western philosophers would want to say 
that metaphysical truths (which are, in the final analysis, the objects of logic) 
can be contradictory. Hence, Being cannot be the same as Nothing, delusion 
cannot be the same as enlightenment. This position does not deny, however, 
that what is experienced as Being can also be experienced as Nothing, or that the 
content of a delusion is the same as the content of enlightenment. To take a 
specific example, it is perfectly acceptable to say that shadows cannot be seen 
unless there is also some light present, but it is nonsense to say, therefore, that 
shadows are light. Part of the difficulty here is that of translation. For some time, 
translators rendered the word soku as the English copula is, for example. But 
the word soku, unlike the English copula, does not necessarily exclude the 
conjoining of contrary terms. It is misleading, therefore, to translate “x soku 
not-x” as “x is not-x.”
In short, translators (and the Kyoto School philosophers themselves when they 
write in Western languages) must be more precise in explaining whether they are 
being descriptive of human experience or logically analyzing the relationship 
between concepts. They must also avoid coining terms that are more puzzling 
than illuminating. For example, what does “Suchness” really mean? If it means, 
for example, “things being (or showing themselves) such as they really are,” 
why not use that phrase rather than making an adverb into a noun? Part of the 
problem is that very few philosophers today will tolerate the hyperboles of 
German Idealism and, if it is possible to write or translate in a style that is not 
Hegelian, that would be preferred.
A second recommendation is that further research be done that would place 
the Kyoto School in the larger context of Japanese thought. It may be true that 
the Kyoto philosophers themselves do not often make explicit reference to 
classical Japanese thought, but the Western audience would benefit from know­
ing more clearly how modern Japanese thought is part of a much older tradition. 
In particular, more attention should be given to themes that run throughout the 
Japanese tradition and are found in aesthetic, literary, dramatic, and poetic 
works as well as Buddhist treatises. For example, one might trace the theme of 
emotions as related to knowledge, or the relationship between principles and 
feelings. Such ideas are discussed in ancient Heian works as well as in the 
modem Kyoto School.
Third, more work needs to be done on the phenomenological description 
of insight and less on the content of that insight. In order to clarify the difference, 
if any, between God and emptiness, perhaps one should more thoroughly analyze 
what it means to experience God as compared with experiencing emptiness. 
Theological or buddhological concepts are abstractions from human experience 




Fourth, the Kyoto School should return to Nishida’s original questions 
about the relationship between religion, aesthetics, and ethics. The way in which 
these three are related in Japanese religion is quite distinctive and it raises im­
portant philosophical questions of universal interest. I do not mean to imply 
that the Kyoto School is no longer interested in this issue, but rather, that the 
topic should perhaps be more emphasized as an item for East-West dialogue. It 
is an issue of great cultural importance around the world.
In conclusion, the Kyoto School of philosophy is one of the most dynamic and 
provocative forces in world thought today. In this time when religious ideals are 
being eroded in every technological nation, when there is a need for a new 
humanism, and when communication across cultures is a prerequisite to world 
peace and the survival of the human race, the Kyoto School has much to offer. 
The West has ignored this tradition for too long, but there are preliminary 
signs that at least some Western thinkers are ready to listen, to question, and 
even to criticize a movement that began when Nishida wrote the opening line 
of Study of Good’. “To experience means to know the facts just as they are.”
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